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In a famous footnote to section 26 of the Transcendental Deduction, Kant draws
a distinction between forms of intuition, which merely give the manifold, and for-
mal intuitions, which give “unity of representation.”¹ Kant remarks that the unity
of representation that belongs to formal intuitions presupposes a synthesis
“which does not belong to the senses but through which all concepts of space
and time first become possible.”² Non-conceptualist interpreters have been
keen to identify the formal intuition of space with geometric space. They main-
tain that the phenomenal space of perceptual experience does not depend on the
understanding for its unity. It is only when we objectively represent space (i.e.,
in geometry) that we must involve the understanding and its conceptual capaci-
ties. Conceptualist interpreters, on the other hand, have maintained that the
unity of pure forms of intuition described in the Aesthetic “is not a separate
unity, independent of the unity that consists in being informed by the catego-
ries.”³ While conceptualists have linked the unity of intuition with categorial
unity, Béatrice Longuenesse and Michael Friedman have both claimed that al-
though the understanding is responsible for the unity of intuition (specifically
that of space), this unity is not conceptual.
In what follows, I argue that any interpretation of the unity of space requires
that we navigate two following seemingly contradictory features of Kant’s ac-
count. First, as we will see when we look carefully at comments that Kant
wrote in response to a series of essays by the mathematician Abraham Gotthelf
Kästner, Kant is committed to the idea of an all-encompassing metaphysical
space that is an actual infinite given and which is presupposed by geometry. If
we understand the formal intuition of space discussed in the famous footnote
to correspond to metaphysical space, then the unity of metaphysical space de-
pends on the original synthetic unity of apperception, which is the highest prin-
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ciple of the understanding. At the same time, Kant is equally committed to the
claim that we should attribute the unity of intuition to sensibility, and not to
any concept of the understanding. Thus, we want to simultaneously explain
the role of the understanding in generating the representation of metaphysical
space as an all-encompassing, actually infinite whole while at the same time ex-
plaining why Kant nevertheless claims that its unity belongs to sensibility, and
not to the concept of the understanding.
In the Transcendental Aesthetic, Kant argues that space is an a priori intu-
ition that is represented as an infinite given manifold. The parts of space are
only limitations of a single “all-encompassing” space, which contains an infinite
set of possible spaces within it.⁴ Kant appeals to the singularity and infinity of
space to argue that space must be an intuitive representation and not a concept,
because “no concept can be thought as if it contained an infinite set of represen-
tations within itself,” but this is precisely how we think of space (and time).⁵
In the Transcendental Deduction, Kant complicates the story from the Aes-
thetic. In section 26, he writes that “space and time are represented a priori
not merely as forms of sensible intuition, but also as intuitions themselves
(which contain a manifold) and thus with the determination of the unity of
this manifold in them.”⁶ In the footnote to this passage, Kant explains:
Space, represented as object (as is really required in geometry), contains more than the
mere form of intuition, namely the comprehension of the manifold given in accordance
with the form of sensibility in an intuitive representation, so that the form of intuition mere-
ly gives the manifold, but the formal intuition gives unity of the representation. In the Aes-
thetic I ascribed this unity merely to sensibility, only in order to note that it precedes all
concepts, though to be sure it presupposes a synthesis,which does not belong to the senses
but through which all concepts of space and time first become possible. For since through it
(as the understanding determines the sensibility) space or time are first given as intuitions,
the unity of this a priori intuition belongs to space and time, and not to the concept of the
understanding (§ 24). ⁷
Kant distinguishes the form of intuition, which merely gives the manifold, from
the formal intuition, which involves a comprehension of the manifold and thus
unity of representation. What is particularly striking in this passage is that
after Kant claims that the formal intuition “presupposes a synthesis” through
which “the understanding determines the sensibility” he goes on to claim—coun-
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ter to expectations that the preceding parts of the footnote naturally elicit—that
this unity “belongs to space and time.” In this footnote, we confront a question
that is at the heart of Kant’s critical philosophy and which has been at the center
of recent debates between non-conceptualist and conceptualist interpretations
of Kant, viz.: what is the relationship between sensibility and understanding
and how should we understand the distinctive contribution of sensibility to cog-
nition?
Non-conceptualists, including Robert Hanna, Lucy Allais, and Colin McLear,
construe space qua form of intuition as the phenomenal space that affords rep-
resentations of distinct particulars in a three-dimensional and egocentrically ori-
ented framework. Providing representations of spatio-temporal particulars that
are given prior to any conceptualization, on this view, is the independent contri-
bution that the faculty of sensibility makes to cognition. In line with an interpre-
tation first suggested by Heidegger, nonconceptualists identify the formal intu-
ition of space with geometric space.⁸ It is only the latter representation of
space that depends on the understanding and, on at least some versions of
the view, space as a form of intuition has its own independent, non-conceptual
unity that is to be contrasted with the conceptual unity of space as a formal in-
tuition.⁹
Kant’s remarks at the beginning of the footnote, in which he says that space
represented as an object “as is really required in geometry,” would seem to sup-
port the non-conceptualist identification of the formal intuition of space with
geometric space. If we turn to comments that Kant wrote in 1790 in response
to a series of essays by the mathematician Abraham Kästner, however, the iden-
tification of the formal unity of space with geometrical space becomes harder to
maintain. Kästner claimed that the infinity of space should be understood as fol-
lowing from the unlimited nature of geometrical construction.We do not have an
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image of an actual infinity, but space is infinite because there is a potential in-
finity of constructions.¹⁰ In the comments that he wrote in response to Kästner,
Kant draws a distinction between geometrical and metaphysical space. Kant
agrees that there is a potential infinity of geometrical constructions, but denies
that this is how we should understand the infinity of space. According to Kant,
geometrical constructions depend “on the original representation of a unitary
(einigen) infinite subjectively given space.”¹¹ As Kant notes, for the geometer to
claim that any line can be extended to infinity, she must already presuppose
that space is greater than any line that can be described within it. Thus, pace
Kästner, the infinity of space cannot itself depend on the potential infinity of
geometrical constructions, because these constructions already presuppose a
given (unitary) infinite space.
Kant’s distinction between metaphysical and geometrical space poses a
problem for non-conceptualist identifications of the formal intuition of space
with geometrical space precisely because Kant claims that geometrical space it-
self presupposes metaphysical space. One possible line of response would be to
claim that metaphysical space is space as a form of intuition. This, in fact, is how
Heidegger reads Kant’s distinction; geometrical space depends on the “original
wholeness” of metaphysical space.¹² But the problem with this response is
that Kant claims that metaphysical space is a unitary infinite space, and in the
footnote, Kant locates unity of representation on the side of space as a formal
intuition, while space as a form of intuition “merely gives the manifold.”¹³ The
more general problem with non-conceptualist treatments of space is that they
want to isolate the space of phenomenal experience from the unified-objective
space discussed in the Deduction. But phenomenal space, for Kant, is just as de-
pendent on metaphysical space as geometric space. As Kant explains in an ear-
lier footnote, because space and time are individual representations that contain
a manifold, “they are thus found to be composite, and consequently the unity of
consciousness, as synthetic and yet as original, is to be found in them.”¹⁴ The
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unity of space and time depends on the original synthetic unity of conscious-
ness, which is the source of all unity.¹⁵
These concerns might lead one to adopt a conceptualist interpretation, ac-
cording to which the unity of formal intuition is a product of a synthesis of
the understanding. One reason for adopting this view is that, as we have just
seen, Kant explicitly states that the unity of intuition “presupposes a synthesis
that does not belong to the senses,” and at the end of the footnote, he draws
the reader’s attention back to section 24 of the Deduction. In section 24, Kant dis-
cusses the transcendental synthesis of the imagination, a synthesis “in accord-
ance with the categories” “which is an effect of the understanding on sensibility
and its first application (and at the same time the ground of all others).”¹⁶ As
McDowell puts it, the unity of the pure forms of intuition “is not a separate
unity, independent of the unity that consists in being informed by the catego-
ries.”¹⁷
The identification of the unity of intuition with categorial unity, however, is
not without its problems. First, as Pierre Keller points out, it is not clear how the
unity of space and time, as “infinite wholes existing prior to their parts” can be
given through a process of synthesis.¹⁸ Any process of synthesis will be indefi-
nite, with infinity serving at most as a regulative ideal. But Kant insists in his re-
sponse to Kästner that metaphysical space is given as an actual infinity that is
presupposed by any geometrical constructions within it. Furthermore, Kant
claims that the unity of intuition precedes all concepts including, it would
seem, the categories. So while the unity of formal intuition presupposes a syn-
thesis, it doesn’t look like it presupposes any synthesis in accordance with con-
cepts. This has led one recent interpreter to make the seemingly paradoxical
 Longuenesse accuses Heidegger of “prying apart” the pure intuition of space in the Aesthetic
from space as a formal intuition, and I think the real worry here is that to the extent that space
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claim that the synthetic unity of space “is not the result of any act of synthesis.”¹⁹
Second, Kant insists at the end of the footnote that the unity of space (and time)
belongs to sensibility and not to the understanding. Likewise, in his comments
on Kästner, Kant connects the original representation of metaphysical space with
sensibility: the representation of space that is given metaphysically “consists in
the pure form of the sensible mode of representation of the subject as intuition a
priori.”²⁰
What we need is an interpretation of the unity of space as a formal intuition
that explains the role of the understanding while still explaining why Kant at-
tributes this unity to sensibility, and not to any concept of the understanding.
I think the right line of interpretation is one that connects the unity of intuition
with the original synthetic unity of apperception but acknowledges that this
unity does not depend on the application of any particular concepts, although
it does depend on the general ability to apply concepts that goes along with
being a discursive understanding.We must recognize that the conceptual capaci-
ties that belong to a unified subject fundamentally affect the forms of sensibility
–although these forms do not themselves depend on the understanding, the
unity of the subject makes possible certain kinds of intuitive representation
that would not otherwise belong to sensibility.
We can imagine, as Kant does at the beginning of the Deduction, that if we
subtracted out the role of the understanding in cognition, appearances would
still be given to us spatially and temporally.²¹ But, in this case, they would not
be given as parts of a single all-encompassing whole. The single all-encompass-
ing wholeness of metaphysical space is quasi-conceptual in that it is part and
parcel of being a conceptual creature that we generate this kind of representa-
tion of space, but it is only quasi-conceptual, because it is not a product of
the application of any particular category or concept, although it goes along
with being a unified subject that we apply the categories. At the same time,
the representation of space as a formal intuition would not be possible for us
if space were not a form of our sensibility. It is only a product of the unity of con-
sciousness in combination with the form of our sensibility. This is why Kant at-
tributes this unity to sensibility and not to the understanding.
It is worth locating this view in contrast to those of Longuenesse and Fried-
man, as they have both argued that the unity of space as a formal intuition de-
pends on the understanding but is not conceptual. According to Longuenesse,
 Messina, James: Kant on the Unity of Space and the Synthetic Unity of Apperception. In: Kant
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the figurative synthesis of imagination, prior to the application of any concepts
(including the categories), generates the pure forms of intuition. The difference
between forms of intuition and formal intuitions, on her account, is that
forms of intuition are merely the potentiality of form, a potentiality that must
be actualized by the understanding; formal intuitions are simply the actualized
forms of intuition.²² The problem with this view is that – at the end of the day – it
reduces sensibility to understanding. Although Longuenesse attempts to fore-
stall this objection by claiming that the pure forms of intuition must already pos-
sess the potentiality of form, her account does not capture the right dynamic be-
tween sensibility and understanding. On my view, space is a form of our
intuition apart from the understanding, and if there were no faculty of under-
standing, it would still “give” appearances; it is only that in combination with
the understanding, a unity of representation that sensibility would not possess
on its own is generated.
Friedman argues that space as the mere form of intuition provides “a mani-
fold of possible spatial perspectives,” which are transformed by the unity of ap-
perception into a single unitary space (space as a formal intuition). A subject at a
given point is in principle able to translate her perspective to another point
through the drawing of a straight line, and from there, change her orientation
by rotating around the point in a given plane. In this way, a manifold of possible
perspectives is unified by the “requirement that any such local perspective can
be accessible to the same perceiving subject via (continuous) motion – via a
(continuous) sequence of translations and rotations”²³ – a requirement that
stems directly from the transcendental unity of apperception. There are two
points on which I agree with Friedman: (1) the unity of space as a formal intu-
ition depends on the transcendental unity of understanding; and (2) space as
a form of intuition does not reduce to the understanding, rather, it provides a
manifold of intuition with features that constrain the way in which the under-
standing applies the categories. Unlike Friedman, however, I deny that any ide-
alized procedure of translations and rotations is responsible for the unity of met-
aphysical space. This procedure, like any procedure of spatial construction,
would itself presuppose metaphysical space. In short, metaphysical space
must be given, but it can only be given to a unified subject.
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